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Protectionist Trade Policies: A
Survey of Theory, Evidence and
Rationale
Cletus C. Coughlin, K. Alec Chrystal and Geoffrey E. Wood
ROTECTIONIST pm-essures have been mounting
won-idwide during the 1980s. These pn-essmmres are due
to various economic problems incltnding the lam-ge and
persistent balance of tn’ade deficits in the United
States; the har’d times expenienced by seven-al indus-
tries; and tire showgrowth of many foreign countn-ies.’
Pn-oponents of protectionist trade policies amgue that
international trade has contributed substantially to
these problems and that protectionist tmade policies
will head to improved n’esults. Professional economists
in the United States, however-, generally agree that
tmade restn-ictions such as tariffs and quotas substan-
tially reduce a nation’s economic well~being.2
This article surveys the theory, evidence and na-
tionale concen-ning protectionist trade policies. The
first section illustrates the gains from fm-ce tn-ade using
the concept of compan-ative advantage. Recent dem’el-
opments in international trade theorm’ that emphasize
other reasons for- gains from trade are also reviewed.
The theoretical discussion is followed hiy an exami-
nation of recent empirical studies that demonstm-ate
the large costs of protectionist trade policies. Then,
the rationale for restricting trade is presented. The
concluding section summarizes the paper’s main
arguments.
Cletus C. Coughlin is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
ofSt Louis. K. Alec Chnystal is the National Westminster BankProfes-
sor ofPersonal Finance at City University, London. Geoffrey E Woodis
a professor of economics at City University, London. This article was
written while Chrystal was a professor ofeconomics at the Universityof
Sheffield, Sheffield, England. Thomas A. Pollmann provided research
assistance.
‘See Page (1987) for a detailed examination of trade protectionism
since 1974.
2 This consensus was found in a survey published in the late 1970s
(Keart et at., 1979). Recent developments in international trade
theory, which can be used to justify governmental intervention in
trade policy, have not altered the consensus (Krugman, 1987).
THE GAINS FRONt FREE TRADE
The most famous demonstration of the gains fn-om
tnade appear-ed in 1817 in David Ricardo’s Principles of
Political Economy and Ta,vation. We use his example
inm’olm’ing tn-ade between England and Portugal to dem—
onstnate how both countries can gain fn-om tnade.. The
two countnies pn-oduce the same two goods, wine and
cloth, and the only pn-oduction costs an’e labor- costs.
The figures below list the amount of lahior leg..
won-ker-daysi requin-ed in each country to pn-oduce one







Since both goods ar-c tiione costly to produce in En-
gland than in Por-tugal, England is ahisolmrtely less
efficient at producinig both goods than its prospective
trading partner. Portugal has an absolute advantage in
hioth wine and cloth. At fin-st glance, this appear-s to
r-ule. (iut mutual gains fn-om trade; howem’e,n-, as we
demonstrate below, absolute advantage is irrelevant in
discerniingwhether tn’ade can hienefit both countn-ies.
The natio of the pr-oductioni costs fon’the two goods
is diffen’ent in the twocountries. hn England. a bottle (if
wine will exchange for3/7 of abolt (ifcloth becamnse the
labor content of the wine is 3/7 of that for (:10th. In
Por’tmtgal, abottle ofwinieivill exchanige for 1/5 of abolt
of cloth. Thus, wine is relatively cheaper in Portugal
than in Englanid and, conm’ersels’, cirith is relativehs’
cheaper in England than in Portmngal. ‘the example
indicates that Pom-tugal has a compam-atim’e adm’amitage in
mvimie pr-oduction and England has a comiipar’ative ad-
vantage in cloth pn’ocluction.
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both countries to gain fn-omn iriternational tr’ade. The
gains arise from both exchange and specialization.
The gains from exchange can be highlighted in the
following manner. Ifa Portn.mguese wine producer sells
five bottles of wine at home, he receives one bolt of
cloth. Ifhe trades in England, he receives more than
two bolts ofcloth. Hence, he can gain by expon-tinghis
mvine to England. English cloth-pn-oducen-s are willing
to trade in Portugal; for em’eny3/7 of a bolt of cloth the
sell there, they get just (iven’ twri bottles of wine. The
English gain from exporting cloth to land imponting
wine fn-omi Por-tugal, and the Portuguese gain from
expon-tingwine to land importing cloth fromi England.
Each country gains by expon-tinig the good in which it
has a compan-ative advantage and by impon-ting the
good in which it has a compam-ative disadm’antage.
Gains fn-om specialization can be denionstrated in
the follomming manner. tnitially, eachi country is pto-
ducing someofboth goods. Suppose that, as an-esutt of
tr-ade, 21 units of labor are shifted fnom mvine to cloth
pnoduction in England, while, in Portugal, 10 units of
labor- are shifted from cloth to wine production. ‘l’his
reallocation oflabor-does not altet- the total amount of
labor’used in the twocountn-ies; howeven-, it causes the
pn-oduction changes listed below.
Bottles of Wine Bolts of Cloth
—7 ±3
The shift of 21 rnnits of labor to the English cloth
industr raises cloth production by three bolts, while
reducing wine production by seven biotttes. In Pomtrn-
gal, the shift (if 10 units of labor from cloth to wine
raises winie pm’oduction liv 10 bottles, while n-educing
cloth pm-oduction by two liolts. This reallocation nif
labor imicreases the total pnoduction of Iiothi goods
wine by thn-ee bottles and cloth hiy one bolt. This
increased output will be shared Iiythe two countries.
Thus, the consumption of liothi goods and the wealth
of both countries an’e incn-eased by the specializa—
tion bm-ought about by trade based on compar-ative
advantage.
TRADE THEORY SINCE HICARDO
Since 1817, numerous analyses have gener-ated in-
sights concerning the gains from tmade, ‘l’hiey chiefly
examine the consequences rif relaxing the assump-
tions used in the pn-eceding example. For example,
labor was the only resource used to produce the two
goods in the example above; yet, labor is really only
one of many resources used to prodmnce goods. The
example also assumed that the costs of producing
additional units of the goods ar-c constant. For exam-
ple, in England, three units of labor an-c used to pro-
duce one bottle ofwine regardless of the level of wine
pn-oduction. In reality, unit production costs could
either increase or- decrease as more is produced. A
thim-d assumption was that the goods an-c produced in
per-fectlvcompetitive mat-kets. tn other- won-ds,an indi-
vidual firm has no effect on the price ofthe good that it
pn’oduces. Some industries, however-, are dominated
by a small numhier of firms, each of which can affect
the manket pr-iceofthe good iw altering its production
decision. Sonic of these extensions at-c discnnssed in
the appendix.
These theoretical developnients genem-atly have
strengthened the case for an open rn-ading system.
They suggest thn-ee soun-ces of gains fi-om trade. First,
as the market potentially served by firms expands
from a national to a world market, then-c are gains
associated with declining per’unit pnoduction costs. A
second sour-ce of gains results fn-omthe reduction in
the monopoly power- of domestic firms. Domestic
firms, facing more pressure from fon-eign competitors,
are forced to produce the (iutput demanded by con-
sumers at the lowest possible cost”l’hird is the gain to
consumers from increased product variety and lomver
prices. Generally speaking, the gains fiomn tm-ade r-esult
from the increase in competitive pressures as the
domestic economy becomes less insulated from the
world economy.
The gains fm’oni free trade can also he illustrated
gt-aphicallv. The shaded insert on pages 14 and 15
examines thegains fiom tt’adein pemfectly competitim’e
mar’kets using supply and demand analysis. The in-
sert also analyzes the effects of tn-ade n-estn-ictions, a
topic that we discuss below.
COSTS OF ‘TRADE PROTECTIONISM
Protectionist trade policies can take numen’ous
forms, some of which are discussed in the shaded
insert on pages 16 amid 17. All forriis of lirotectioni an-e
‘A profit-maximizing firm produces its output at minimum cost. When
firms are insulated from competition, costs are not necessarily being
minimized. This situation, which is catted X-etficiency, has been
stressed by Leibenstein (1980). The increase in competitive pres-
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Then-c have lieeni numerous studies of the costs of
pr’otectionism. We begin by examining three recent
studies of pm-otectioriism in the United States, then
The specific goal of protectionist tn-ade policies is to proceed to studies examining developed and finally,
expand domestic pn-oductioni in the protected indus— developing countries.
ti-ies, benefiting the owners, workers and suppliers of
r-esour-ces to the protected industry. The goven’nment Costs qfProtectionism in the Crated
imposing pr-otectioniist trade policies mayalso benefit, States
forexample, in the form of tan’iff revenue.
-- - . Recent studies by Tan and Morkre 119841, t-lickok 1he expansiomi ofdoniestic pn-odnnctnon mni pr’otected — -- -
-- - .- - - 1985) and Huliuauer et al. 11986) esttmated the costs of
nndustiits is not costless it n quit is tddntnonal
pi otcctnotusni in tin Unitcd St ntis Ilit s studn s usc
sources from other itidustrres. Consequently, output -. - - - -.
-- . - - , , . different estnmatnoni procedun’es, examine diffem-ent
iii other domestic industm-ies is i-educed. these nndus— - .. --
-- - . . protectnonnst policies arid coverdnfferent tnriieperiods.
trres also might be made less competrtnve hecanise ot -- Norn thiclcss thcv ptovnde consnstenit mesults
higher pt-ices for imported inputs. Since protectionist
tr-ade policies frequently incr-ease the price of the Tair and Mork,-e 11984) estimate annual costs to the
protected good, domestic consumers are liar-med. U.S. economy of 812.7 billion 1983 dollars) from all tan—
l’hey lose in two ways. I-inst. their consuniption of the ifs and from quotas on automobiles, textiles, steel and
pr-otected good is n-educed because of the, associated sugar-. Their cost estinuate is a net measur-e in which
rise in its price. Second, they consume less of other the losses ofconsumers are offset partially by the gains
goods, as their output declines and pm-ices r-ise. of domestic producer’s and the U.S. gover’nment.
The preceding discussion highlights the domestic Estimates liv thickok 1985) indicate that tr-ade rt~—
winniersand losers due to pnotectionist trade policies. strictions on only three goods —— clothing, sugam-, and
Domestic produrcers of the liiotected good and the automobiles caused increased consumer expenidi—
government iftariffs an-c imposed) gain; domestic con- tunes of $14 billion in 1984. I-Iickokalso shows that low—
somers and otliei cloniestic pn’oducem-s lose. F’on-eigni income families am-c affected mom-c than high—income
interests an-c also affected by tr’ade resti-ictions. The fànnilies. The impor’t r’estm’aints on clothing, sugar and
pn’otection of doniestic pn-oducers will harm some automobiles are calculated to be equivalent to a 23
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tax added to the normal income tax) for families with
incomes less than $10,000 in 1984 and a 3 percent
income tax sin-charge fom families with incomes cx-
ceeding $60,000.
Hufbauer et al. 11986) examined 31 cases in which
trade volumes exceeded $100 million arid the United
States imposed protectionist trade restrictions.4 They
generated estimates of the welfare consequences for
each major-group afected see table 1). The figures in
the table indicate that annual consumer losses exceed
$100 million in all hut six of the cases. The largest
losses, $27 billion pen- year-, come fnom protecting the
textiles and apparel industry. There also ane lan-ge
~While there were cases in which the industry adjusted to its new
competitive position and the protection was terminated, these cases
were more the exception than the rule. In far more cases, protection-
isi policies were maintained indefinitely or removed because of
favorable demand changes.
consumet losses associated with protection in car-hon
steel $6.8 billion), automobiles $5.8 billion) and dairy
products $5.5 billion).
The purpose of pr-otectionism is to IJm’otect jobs in
specific industries. A useful approach to gain some
penspective on consumer- losses is to express these
losses on a per-job-saved basis. In 18 of the 31 cases,
thecost per-job-saved is $100,000 or more pen-year-; the
consumer losses per-job-saved in benzenoid chemni-
cais, carbon steel )two separate periodsL specialty
steel, and bolts, nuts and screws exceeded $500,000
per year.
Table I also neveals that domestic producers were
the primary beneficiaries of protectionist policies;
however, there are some noteworthy cases where fom~
eign producers realized relatively lam-gegains. For the
US-Japanese voluntary export agn-eenient in automo-
biles, foreign producers gained 38 percent of what
domestic consumers lost, while asimilar computationFECfRAL RESERVE BANK OFsr. LOWS JANUARY/FEBRUARY lOSS
Table 1
Distribution of Costs and Benefits from Special Protection
Producer
- consumer Losses Gains eltare costs of Restraints
Gamn to Tariff Efficiency
Totals Per job Totals foreigners revenue loss
(million saved’ (million (million (million (mmIlion
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forthe latest phase of protection for carbon steel was
29 percent.
Finally, table 1 indicates that the efficiency losses
ane small in compan-ison to the total losses bor’ne by
consumers. These efficiency losses, which are defined
precisely and illusu-ated in the fir-st shaded insert,
result fr-on) the excess domestic production and the
reduction in consumption caused lw pr-otectnonist
trade policies. En laige cases such as textiles and
apparel, petroleum, dairy pm-oducts and the maritime
industries, these losses equal or exceed $1 billion. It is
likely that these estimates understate the actual costs
because they do not capture the secondary effects that
occur as pn-oduction and consumption changes in one
industry affect other industries.~In addition, restric-
tive trade policies generate additional costs because of
hun-eaucn-atic enforcement costs and efforts by the
pi-ivate sector to influence these policies fon- their own
gain as well as simply comply with administrative
r-egulations.
Costs o/’Protectionism Throughout the
World
In 1982, the Organization for Economic Co—
opet-ation and Development OECD) began a pn-oject to
analyze the costs and benefits of protectionist policies
in manufacturing in OECD countnes. The DEC13
1983) highlighted anumbei- ofways that protectionist
policies have generated costs far in excess of benefits.
Since protectionist policies increase pr-ices, the i-epon-t
concludes that the attainment of sustained non-
inflationary growth is hindered by such price—
increasing effects. Moreovei-, economic growth is po—
tentiallv reduced ifthe uncertainty created by varying
tnace policies depnesses investment.
Wood and Mudd 1978), and many others, have
shown that impoi-ts do not cause higher unemploy-
ment. Conversely, the OECD study stresses the fact
that a r-eduction in imports via trade restr-ictions does
not cause gn-eater employment. A reduction in the
value of imports i-esults in a similar reduction in the
5Recent estimates of the costs of protectionist policies using general
equilibrium models suggest thai the secondary effects, to the limited
extent they are measurable, are substantial. For example, Grais, de
Melo and Urata (1986) estimate that the elimination of quotas in
Turkey in 1978 would have caused a 5.4 percent rise in gross
domestic product, while Clarete and Whalley (1985) estimate that
the elimination of tariffs, quotas and export taxes in the Philippines in
1978 would have caused a 5.2 percent rise in gross national
product.
value of exports. One r-ationale for this finding is that a
reduction in the pun-chases of foreign goods reduces
foreign incomes and, in turn, causes reduced foreign
purchases ofdomestic goods.
While the reduction in impot-ts increases employ-
mnent in industries that produce pn-oducts similar to
the previously imported goods, the reduction in cx-
por-ts decreases employment in the expor-t industries.
In other words, while some jobs are saved, other-s ar-c
lost; however-, this economic n-ealitv may not be obvi-
ous to businessmen, labon- union leaders, politicians
and others. Luttrell 1978) has stressed that the jobs
saved by piotectionist legislation are more readily
obsen’ed than the jobs lost due to protectionist legis-
lation. In other words, the jobs that are protected in,
say, the textiles industry by U.S. import restrictions on
foreign textiles are more readily apparent land publi-
cized) than the jobs in agriculture and high technol-
ogy industries that do riot materialize because of the
impoi-t restrictions. These employment effects will net
to appi-oximately zei-oY
t’he OECt) study also stresses that developing coun-
ti-ies need exports to offset their debts. Thus, pr-otec-
tionist tn-ade policies by developed countries affect not
only the economic activity of the developing coun—
tries, but the stability of the intet-natiorial financial
system as debtor nations find it increasingly difficult
to service their debts.
Not only does a free trade policy by developed
countries benefit developing countries, hut a free
trade policy by developing countries benefits develop-
ing countries. A recent World Bank study (1987) of 41
developing countr-ies compar-ed the perion-mance of
countries following a fr-ce tr-ade policy with countries
following a restricted trade policy.’ Table 2 lists the
eRecent evidence shows that protectionist legislation actually may
reduce employment. Denzau (1987) estimated that 35,600 manu-
facturing jobs were lost as a result of the September 1984 voluntary
export restraints that limited the levelof U.S. steel imports. Despite
an increased employment for producers of steel (14000) and pro-
ducers of inputs for steel producers (2,800), these increases were
more than offset by the 52,400 job losses by steel-using firms.
These losses are due to the higher steel prices that cause steel-
using firms to be less competitive in export markets and subject
them tomore foreigncompetition in the U.S. market.
‘The World Bank study divides trade strategies into two groups:
outward oriented and inward oriented. An outward-oriented strat-
egy, which we call a free trade policy, is one in which trade and
industrial policies do not discriminate between production for the
domestic market and exports, nor between purchases of domestic
and foreign goods. An inward-oriented strategy, which we call a
restricted trade policy, is one in which trade and industrial policies
are biased toward production for the domestic market relative to the
export market.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1988
Table 2
Annual Average Growth of Per Capita Real Gross National Product
Free Trade Restricted Trade
Period Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly
1963-73 S;ngapore 9 0-~ Braznl 55% Ynngoslav-a 49% Turkey a 5’--.
Soutn Korea 7 1 lsrae- 5.4 Mexnco 43 Dornnr-cun Pc-publnc 34
Hong Kong 6 0 Tha-and 49 Nngena 42 Burur-dn 3 2
l-ndonesna 46 Turrs:a 4 0 Arger-t na 3
costa Rnca 39 Kenya 3 9 Pakrstar 3
Malays.a 38 Phnlnppnnes 2 2 Tanzanna 27
Ivory coast 35 Bolnvna 20 Sm Lanka 2 3
co-orbna 33 Hondu’as 1 9 Erhnoona 1 9
Guaremaa 27 E Sa-vador 1 4 Chnle 1 7
~amerooi 01 Madagascar 1 1 Peru i
N-caraoua 1 I Uruguay l 5





1973—55 Snngapore 65 Malaysn~ 4 1 Cameroon 56 Banglacesh 20
HongKong 63 Tnanlano SO lndorc-sna 40 mona 20
SouthKorea 54 Tunrsna 29 S’n Lanka 33 Buruno 1 2
Braz-- 1 ~ Pa~nsnan 31 Domnnncan Repub.rc 05
Turkey 1 4 Yugoslavia 2 7 Efhnoona 0 4
Isree. 04 cola-tb-a 1 8 Sudan 0 4
Uruguay 0.4 Mexnco 1 3 Peru 1
chnne 0.1 Phnlnpp-nes 11 Tan?anna ‘ 6
Kcnya 0 3 Argenrnna 2 0
Honduras 0 I Zamh,a 2 3
Senegan 05 Nnqerna 2 5
costa Rca 1 0 Bonnvna 31
Guatemala 1 0 Ghana 3 2
Ivory Coast 1 2 Madagascar 34
En Savaoo’ 35
Nncaragua 39
SOURCE World Doveroomenn Reporl 1987 and The Economist l1987l
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for restricting tiade and provides explanations for the
existence ofprotectionist trade policies.
National he/ease
The national defense argument says that impor-t
barrier-s are necessary to ensure the capacity to pro-
duce cr-ucial goods in anational emergency. While this
ar-gument is especially appealing for weapons dun-ing
awar, then-c will likely be demands from other indus-
tn-iesthat deem themselves essential. For- example, the
footwear industry will demand protection because
militam personnel need combat boots.’
The national defense ar-gument ignores the possibil-
ity of purchases from friendly countries dur-ing the
emer-gency. The possibilities of storage and depletion
r-aise additional doubts about the general applicability
of the aigument. If crucial goods can be stored, for
example, the least costly way to prepare for an erner-
gency might be to buy thegoods from foreigners at the
lowworld pr-ice befone an emer-gency and store them.
Ifthe crucial goods ar-c depletable miner-al resour-ces,
such as oil, then therestriction ofoil imports befon-e an
erner-gency will cause a more rapid depletion of do-
mestic r-eserves. Once again, stockpiling might bea far
less costly alternative.
Income Redistribution
Since pr-otectionist tr-adepolicies affect the distribu-
tion of income, a trade restriction might be defended
on the grounds that it fayors some disadvantaged
group. It is unlikely, however, that trade policy is the
best tool fordealing with the perceived evils ofincome
inequality, because ofits bluntness and adverse effects
on the efficient allocation of resources. Attempting to
equalize incomnes directly by tax and transfer pay-
merits is likely less costly than rising trade policy. In
addition, as Hickok’s 19851 study indicates, trade re-
strictions on many items increase r-ather than de-
crease income inequality-
Optirnurn Tariff.zirgurnent
The optimum tar-iffargument applies to situations
in which a country has the economic po\\’el’ to alter
won-Id prices. This power exists because the countr
or a group of countries acting in consor-t like the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countr-iesl is
such a large producer- or consumer of a good that a
change in its production or- consumption patterns
influences world prices. For- example, by imposing a
tarifL the countny can make tbr-eign goods cheaper.
Since a tariffreduces the demand for foreign goods, if
the tariff-imposing country has some mar-ket power-,
the world price for the good will fall.’ The tariff-
imposing countr will gain because the pr-iceper unit
ofits imnports will have decreased.
There ar-c a number of obstacles that preclude the
widespread application of this ar-gnment. Few couri-
tries possess the necessary market power and, when
they do, only a small number of goods is cover-ed.
Secondly, in a won-Id of shifting supply and demand,
calculating the optimum tan-iff and adjusting the rate
tochanging situations is difficult. Finally, the possibil-
ity offoreign retaliation to an act of economic warfare
is likely. Such metaliation could leave both countries
won-se off than they would have been in a fm-ce trade
environment -
Balancing the Balance o/’Trade
Many conntnies enact prDtectionist tnade policies in
the hope of eliminating a balance of trade deficit on
increasing a balance of tr-ade surplus. The desire to
increase a balance of ti-ade surplus follows from the
mer-cantilist view that larger trade surpluses are bene-
ficial from a national perspective.
This argument is suspect on a numben ofgrounds.
First, there is nothing inherently undesir-able about a
tr-ade deficit or- desirable about a surplus” For exam-
ple, faster economic growth in the United States than
in the rest of the won-Id would tend to cause a trade
deficit. In this case, the trade deficit is a sign of a
healthy economy. Second, protectionist policies that
r-educe irnports will cause exports to decrease by a
comparable amount. Hence, an attempt to increase
exports permanently relative to imports will fail. tt is
doubtful that the trade deficit will be reduced even
tempor-ar-ily because imnpont quantities do not decline
quickly in r-esponse to the higher- impor-t pr-ices and
the revenues offoreign producer-s might r-ise.
‘If a country such as the United States has no market power, the
world price is fixed. Consequently, the price faced by U.S. con-
sumers and producers rises by the full amount of the tariff. In the
optimum tariff case, the price faced by U.S. consumers and pro-
ducers rises, but not by the full amount of the tariff. This must be the
case because the world price falls and the amount of the tariff is the
difference between the world price and the U.S. price.
“See Chrystal and Wood (1988) earlier in this issue. ‘See Pine (1984).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF Si. LOUIS JANUARYIFEBRUARY INS
Protection ofJobs Public Choice
The protection of jobs ar-gumenit is closely related to
the balance of trade argument. Sinceareduction in
imports via trade n-estr-ictions will result in a similar
reduction in exports, the over-allemployment effects,
as found in the OECD 1985) study and many others,
are negligible. While the overall effects are negligible.
won-kens land r-esour-ce owners) in specific industries
ame affected differently.
A domestic industry faced with increased impomts
fr-ore its foreign competition is under pressure to n-e-
duce production and lower- costs. Pn-oductive n-c-
sources mnust mnove fi-om this industry to other domes-
tic industmies. Wor-ker-s must change jobs and, in some
cases, relocate to other cities. Since this change is
forced upon these workers, these won-ken-s hear m-eal
costs that they are likely to resist. A similar statement
can be made about the owner-s of capital in the af-
fected industry.
Workers and other mesoinr-ce owner-s ~villllikely resist
these changes by lobbying for trade r-estr-ictions. The
pr-eviously cited studies on the costs of protectionism
demonstt-ated that tr-aderestrictions entail substantial
neal costs as well. ‘l’hese costs likely exceed the adjust-
mnent costs because the adjustment costs ar-cone-time
costs, while the costs of protectionism continue as
long as trade restrictions are maintained.
An obvious question is why politicians supply the
protectionist legislation demanded by worker’s arid
otlier resource owner-s. A bm-anch of economics called
public choice, which focuses on the interplay between
individual pr-eferences and political outcomes, pro-
vides an answer. Thepublic choice liter-atur-eviews the
politician as an individual who offer-s voters a bundle
of governmentally supplied goods in order to win
elections.’ Many argue that politicians gain by pr-ovid—
ing protectionist legislation. Even though the national
economic costs exceed the benefits, the politician
faces different costs and benefits.
l’hose hat-med by a protectionist trade policy for a
domestic industry, especially household consumen-s,
will incur a small individual cost that is difficult to
identify. For example, a consumer is unlikely to pon-
der how much extra a shirt costs because of protec-
tionist legislation for the textiles and apparel industry.
“The role of pressure groups, acting in their economic self-interest,
has been stressed by Stigler (1g71) and Peltzman (1976). For
references, as well as an example of an international trade study
focused on the interaction of politicians and interest groups, see
Coughlin (1985).
Even though the aggregate effect is lange, the harm to
eachconsumen- may besmall. ‘this small cost, ofwhich
an individual may not even be awar-e, and the costs of
organizing consumers deter the formationi of a lobby
against the legislation.
On the other hand, wor’ker-s arid other- n’esoun-ce
owner-s arevex-v concer-ned about protectionist legisla—
tiori for their industry. liieir benefits tend to be large
individually and easy to identity. Their voting and
campaign contributions assist politicians who sup-
port thein positions and penalize those who do riot.
Thus, politiciarns are likely to respond to their de-
mnands for- pr-otectionist Iegislationiz
In/Cat .Industries
‘Ehe preceding ar-gunient is couched in terms of
protecting a domestic industry. A slightly different
argument, the so-called infant industry case, is
couched in terms of promoting a domestic industry.
Suppose an industry, alr’eady established in other’
countm-ies, is being established in a specific coinntrv.
The country might riot he able to r’ealize its compar-a—
tive advantage in this industry because of the existing
cost and other advantages of foreign fir-nis. Initially,
owner-s of the fledgling firm must be willing to suffer
losses until the firm develops its mar-ketand lower-s its
production costs to the level of its fon-eign rivals. In
on-den- to assist this entr-ant, tan-ill’ pn-otection can be
used to shield the fir-ni fn’omsome for-eigncompetition.
After this temnporan~period ofprotection, free trade
should be n-estor-ed; howeven-, the removal of tariff
protection frequently is resisted. As the industry de-
velops, its political power- to thwan-t opposing legisla-
tion also increases.
Another- pr-oblennwith the infant industry arguniierit
is that a tariff is not the best way to intervene. A
production subsidy is super-ion- to a tariff if the goal is
to expand pn-oduction. A suhsidv will do ibis directly,
while a tariff has the undesin-able side effect of r-educ—
inig consumptioti.
In many cases, intervention might not be appr-opr’i—
ate at all. Ifthe infant industny is a good candidate for
being competitive inter-nationudly, borr-ouing from the
2Special interests benefiting from trade will likely resist the forcesfor
protectionist legislation.Destler and OdeIl(1987) identify exporters,
industrial import users, retailers of imported products, businesses
providing trade-related services, foreign exporters, and foreigngov-
ernments as interest groups capable of exerting some anti-
protection pressure. Decisions about protectionist legislation result
from the interaction of both pro-protection and anti-protection
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pr-ivate capital markets can finance the expansion.
Investors are willing to ahsor-b losses temporarily ifthe
prospects for- future profits ar-c sufficiently good.
Spillover Effects
The justification forpn-otecting anindustry, infant or
otherwise, frequently entails a suggestion that the
industry generates spilloven’ benefits for other’ in—
dustrres ot’ individuals fon which the industry is not
compensated. Despite patent laws, one common sug-
gestion is that cer-tain industn-ies are not fully compen-
sated for their- r-esear-ch arid development expendi-
tur-es. This argument is frequently clirected toward
technologically progressive industr’ies where some
firms can capture the n’esults of other- finns’ n’esearch
and development simply by dismantling a pr-oduct to
see how it wor’ks.
The application of this ar-gumnent, however-, enigeti-
den-s a niurnbem of pn-oblems. Spillovens of knowledge
ane diffic,ult to measure. Since spilloven-s am-e not mar-
ket tr-ansactions, they do not leave an obvious tr-ail to
idemitifv their- heneficiar-ies. The lack of niar-ket tr-ansac-
tions also complicates an assessment of the value of
these spillover’s. To determine the appr-optiate sub-
sidy, one must be able to place a dollar value on the
spillovers genen-ated by a given reseamch and develop-
nient expenditure. Actually, the calculation requires
munch mom-c than the aln’eady difficult task of r’econ-
stn-ucting the past. Itr-equir-escomplex estimates ofthe
spilloven’s’ future worth as well. Since resources are
moved fioni other’ industries to the targeted industry,
the goven-nment must tinder-stand the functioning of
the entire economy.
Finally, then-c are political pr-ohlems. An aggressive
application of this an-gumuent might lead to retaliation
and a mutually destructive tn-ade war’. In addition, as
inten’est gr’oups compete for the gover-nmental assis-
tance, there is no guar-antee that the tight gr-oups
will be assisted or’ that they will use the assistance
efficientl.
Strategic Trade Policy
Recent theor-etical developments have identified
cases in which so-called stn-ategic tr-ade policy is supe-
rior- to fl-ce trade. As we discussed earlier, decreasing
unit production costs and market structures that con-
tain monopoly elements ar-e conirnon hi industr-ies
involved in inter-miational tmade. Mar-ket imperfections
immediately suggest the potential benefits of govern—
mental intervention. In the str-ategic tr’ade policy argu-
ment, gover-nmnent policy can alter the terms of com-
petition to favor-domestic over’foreign firms and shift
the excess returns in monopolistic mar-kets from for-
eign to domestic fir-ms.
Knugman 1987) illustrates an example of the angu-
rnent.Assume that there is only onefirm in the United
States, Boeing, and one multinational Iir-m in Europe
Airbus, capable of producing a 150-seat passenger
aircraft. Assume also that the aim-cr-aft is pn-oduced only
for export, so that the returns to the firm can be
identified with the national inter’est. This export mar-
ketis pn-ofitable foreither fin-nmif it is the only producer;
however, it is unprofitable for both fir-ms to pnodtice
the plane. Finally, assume the following payoffs are
associated with the four combinations of production:
1) ifboth Boeing and Airbus pr-oduce the aircr-aft, each
fir’m loses $5 million; 2) if neither Boeing non’ Ain’bus
pn’oduces the aircn-aft, profits are zero; 3) if Boeing
pn-oduces the aircraft and Air-bus does not, Boeing
profits by $100 million and Air-bus haszero pr-oUts;and
4) if Air-bus produces the air-cr-aft and Boeing does not,
Airbuns profits by $100 million and Boeing has zero
pr’ofits -
Which finnn)s) will pr-oduce the air-craft? The exam-
ple does not yield a unique outcome. A unique out-
come can be genen-ated if one firm, say Boeing, has a
head stant and begins production before Airbus. tn
this case, Boeing will n-cap pn-ofits of $100 million and
will have deter-n-ed Airbus from emitening the niarket
because Air-bus will lose $5 million if it enter’s after
Boeing.
Stnategic trade policy, however-, suggests that judi-
cious gover-nmental intervention can alter the out-
come. Ifthe Eun’opean governments agree to subsidize
Air-bus’ production with $10 million no mnatter’ what
Boeing does, then Airbus will produce the plane. Pro-
duction by Air-bus will yield more profits than not
producing, no matter- what Boeing does. At the same
time, Boeing will be cleterred fi’om pn’oducingbecause
it would lose money. Thus, Airhus will captur-e the
emitim’e rnar-ket and reap profits of $110 mnillion, $100
mnillion ofwhich can be viewed as a tnansfer of pr-ofits
from the United States.
The criticismns of a strategic trade policy ar-c similar’
to the criticisms agaimist pr-otectimig a technologically
pr-ogn-essiveindustry that gener-ates spilloverbenefils.’’
Then-c ar’e major- infonmational pn-obleniis in applying a
‘3A recent volume edited by Paul Krugman (1986) examines the
Øolicy implications of the new trade literature, See Grossman’s
article in that volume for a discussion of the information require-
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strategic trade policy. The government must estimate
the potential payoff of each course of action. Eco-
nomic knowledge about the behavior of industnies
that have monopoly elements is limited. Firms mnay
behave competitively on- cooper-ativel~and may com-
pete by setting pm-ices on- outpr.rt. The behavior- of rival
govem-nments also must he amiticipated. l”oreign r’etalia-
tiomi must be viewed as likely where substantial profits
are at stake. In addition, many intem-est gr-oups will
compete for the govem-nmental assistance. Though
only a small number’ of sector-s can be conisidered
poterrtiall~stmategic, many industries will make acase
for assistance.
Reciproci~vand the “Level Playing Field”
Bhagwati and Irwin 1987) note that U.S. tnade policy
discussions in recent year-s have frequently stressed
the importance of “fair tr-ade.” The concept of fair
trade, which is technically n-efen-red to as reciprocity,
means diffen-ent things to different people.
Under the Genen-al Agreement on ‘I’ariffs and ‘made,
negotiations to reduce trade ham-mien-s focus upon
matching concessions. This form of reciprocity,
known as first-difference reciprocity, attempts to n-e-
duce tradebarrier-s by r-equiring acountry to provide a
tariff rtduction of value compan-able to one pr-ovided
by the other country. In this case, n’eciprocity is
defined in terms of matching changes.
Recent U.S. demands, exemplified by the Gephardt
amendment to the cur-rent tn-ade legislation, r-eyeal an
approach that is called fbll reciprocity. This approach
seeks r-eciprocitv in terms of the level of pr-otection
bilaterally and ovem a specific n-ange of goods. Beci-
pn-ocitv n-equines equal access and this access can he
deter-mined by bilatemal tnade balances. A tnade deficit
with a trading partner is claimed to be prima fade
evidence of unequal access. Examples ahounnd. For
example, U.S. constr’uction fin-mns have not had a major’
contract in Japan since 1965, while Japanese con-
stm-uction fim-msdid $1.8 billion wonth ofbirsiness inthe
United States in 1985 alone. Recent legislation liar-s
Japanese panticipation in U.S. public won-ks pnojects
until the Japanese offer r-ecipn-ocal pr-ivmleges.
As the name suggests, the fundamental argument
for fain-trade is one ofequity. Domestic producens irm a
fl-ce tnade country argue that foneign trade harrier-s am-c
unfair because it places them at a competitive disad-
vantage. In an extreme yer-sion, it is asserted that this
unfain’ competition will vir-tually eliminate [1.5. mnanu—
factoring, leaving only jobs that consist primarily of
flipping hamburgers at fast food restaun-ants on-, as
Bhag%%-ati and Inwin have said, rolling mice cakes at
Japanese-owned sushi bar-s. While domestic pm-o-
ducers are relatively disadvantaged, the wisdom of a
pn-otectionist response is doubtful. Again, the costs of
pr-otectionismnexceed substantially the benefits froni a
miatiorial perspective.
In an attempt to r’einfon-ce the ar-gument for fair’
tnade, pr-oponents also an-gue that n-etaliatory thn-eats,
combined with changes in tariffs and mion—tam’iff barri-
ers, allowfor the simultaneous pr-otectiomi of domestic
industries against unequal comnpetition and indunce
mon-c open fom-eign mnar-kets. This mom-c flexible ap-
pr-oach is viewed as super-ior to a ‘‘one—sided’’ free
trade policy. ‘l’he suggestion that a fair tnade policy
produces a tnading environment with fewer- trade ne-
strictions allows pmoponents to asser-t that such a
policy serves to pn-omote both equity and efficiency. In
other- words, not only will domestic and foreign pno-
ducem-s in thesame industry be treated equally. but the
gains associated with a fn’eer tr-ading envir-onment will
he n-ealized.
On theother- hand, critics of afair trade policy argue
that such a policy is simply disguised protectionisni
— it simply achieves the goals of specific intemest
gn-otnps at the expense of the nation at lam-ge. In mnany
cases, fairtr-ader-s focus oria specific pr-actice that can
be portr-ayed as pn-otectionist while ignon-imig the entine
package of policies that are affecting a nation’s comn-
petitive position. In these cases, the fon-eign coumitmv is
muon-c likely either not to respond or retaliate by in-
cr-easing r-athcr- than n-educing their tracle barriens. In
the latter- case, the escalation of trade han-mien-s causes
losses for- both nations, which is exactly opposite to
the alleged efi’ects ofan activist fair trade policy.
Critics of fain’ trade proposals ar-c especially both-
er-ed by the use of bilateral trade deficits as evidence of
unfair’ trade. In aworld of many tn-ading countries, tlìe
trade between two countnies need not be balanced for’
the tr-ade of each to be in global balance. Diffemimig
demands and pr-oductive capabilities across countries
will cause aspecific coumitry to havetrade deficits with
some countries and sur-pluses with other- counitmies.
These bilateral imbalances an-c a rionmual result of
coumitmies tradimig on the basis of comnpar-ative advan-
tage.’4 Thus, the focuns on the hilater-al tnade deficit can
produce inappr-opriate conclusions about fain-ness
and, niiore impor-tantly, policies attempting to elimi-
nate bilaten’al trade deficits ar-c likely to be very costly
becaunse they eliminate the gains from a multilateral
tn-ading system.
‘~Bergsten and Cline (1985) estimate an equilibrium U.S-Japanese
bilateral trade deficit of $20—$25 billion annually.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OfST. LOUIS JANUARY/FEBRUARY INS
CONCLUSION
The pr-olifer-ation of pnotectm()nist tr-ade policies in
recemit year-s pm-ovides an impetus to m-econsidem’ their’
wor-th. In the won-id of tr-aditionial trade theory, chan-ac—
ter’ized by perfect competition, a definitive recoin—
mendatiori in favor- of fl-ce trade can he made. The
gains fnonii initen-nationial trade result fm-om a m-ealloca—
tioni ofpn-oducti~’e m-esour-ces towam-dgoods that cami he
lin’o(lumced less costly at home than abroad amid the
exchange ofsome of these goods for’goods that can he
pm-odunced at less cost aljnoad than at home.
Recent developments in inter-national tm-ade theory
have examitied the consequences of international
tr-ade in mar-kets when-c tliene ar-c nianket imperfec-
tions, such as momiopoly and technological spillo\’er-s.
Do these imperfections justitv protectionist trade poli-
cies? The answer- continues to he no. While protec-
tionist trade policies mayoffset monopoly power- over-—
seas or advantageously use domestic moniopol~
power, trade restrictions tend to reduce the competi-
tion faced by domestic producer’s, protecting domes-
tic producer-s at the expense of domestic conisunIens.
‘chic empirical evidence is clear-—cut. The costs of
pr-otectionist tr-ade policies far exceed the benefits.
‘the losses suffer-ed by consumer-s exceeml the gains
reaped by domestic pr-oducen’s and government. Low-
inconiie consumer-s ar-c n’elatively more adversely af-
fected than high-income consumers. Not only are
then-c inefficiencies associated with excessive domes-
tic production and restricted consumption, but then-c
ane costs associated with the enfor-cemnent of the pm-o—
tectionist legislationm and attempts to influence trade
policy.
The primam~reason for these costly protectionist
policies relies on apublic choice an-gumemit.The desire
to influence tr’ade policy arises froni thefact that trade
policy changes benefit some gr-oups, while har-ming
other’s. Consumer-s are ham-med by pr-otectionist legis-
lation; however-, ignor-ance, small individual costs, and
the high costs of or-ganizing consumers pr-event the
consumers from beirig an efl’ective for-ce. Onthe other
hand, wor-ken-s and other resour-ce owner-s in an indus-
tn-v ar-c mor-e likely to be effective politically because of
their relative ease of om-ganizing and their- individually
large and easy-to-identify benefits. Politicians inter--
ested in re—election will most likely respond to the
demands for- pmotectionist legislation ofsuch an inter-
est group.
‘I’he enmpimical evidence also suggests that the ad-
~‘er-seconsumer effects of pr-otectionist trade policies
am’e riot shor-t-lived. These policies genem-ate lower’ eco-
nomic gn-owthn-ales than the rates associated with fr-ce
trade policies. In turn, slow gr-owth contributes to
additional pr-otectionist pressum-es.
Interest gr-ouppressunes from industries expenienc-
ing difficulty and the gener-al appeal ofa “level playing
field’’ combine to make the reduction of trade hiar-riers
especially difficult at the present timmic in the United
States. Nonetheless, national inten-ests will be served
best by such an admittedly difficultpolitical comm-se. Imi
light of the cur-rent tJm’uguay Round negotiations un-
der- the General Agn-eement on Tan’iffs and Tm-ade, as
well as numerous bilateral discussions, this fact is
especially timnely.
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Appendix
Developments in International Trade Theory and the
Gains from Trade
Since 1817, numerous developments have taken
place in inter-national tr’ade theory. Theconsequences
of mone than one factor of pn-oduction, increasing amid
decn-easing unit pn-oduction costs, amid imper-fectly
competitive markets are examined mi this appemmdix.
Special attention is focused on developments in inten’-
natiomial tm-ade theory in the last decade.
Increasing the Number ofFactors of
Production
Assume that, in the United States, two r’esoun-ces,
labor- arid capital (e.g., machinesi, ar-c used in the
pr-oduction of two goods, automobiles amid air-planes.
The pn’ices of these resources will be affected differ-—
ently by tr-ade. As trade develops, demnanid for- the
exported good that is, the good in which the United
States has a comparative advantage) will incn’ease amid
demand for U.S. pr-oductiomi of the imported good will
fall. ‘h’his demand shift causes the price of the ex-
ported good to rise n’elative to the pr-ice of the ire—
ported good. Similar-h’, the shiff may also pn-oduce
changes imm the pr-ices of r-esoun-ces: however-, these
pm-ice changes an-c not always obvious.
Initially, assumne that the r’esoum-ces cannot be tm-ans—
ferr’ed across industn’ies. For examnple, the labor- and
capital used to pr-oduce automobiles, the good im—
ported into the United States, cannot he used to pro-
duce aimplamies, the expon-ted good. Consequently, as
the pr-ice of airphanes n-ises imi the United States, the
compensation for- lahor and capital in the air-plane
industry will rise; meanwhile, the decline in automo-
bile pr-ices causes a decline in compensation for- labor
and capital in the industry. It would riot be surpn-ising
if labor and owners of capital in the imidustrv would
mesist such changes by asking for- tn-ade pm-otection.
While resources may not be easily transfer-n-ed
acr-oss industries imi the shon’t n-un, worker-s can change
jobs and capital cart be moved as time passes. hf
resources are mobile, then the longer-—run conse-
quences for- labom- and owmien’s of capital an-c different
from those described above. Even iflahor and capital
are perfectly mnobihe, however, one set of m’esour’ce
owner-s maybenefit while another- gn-oup is har-mned by
trade.’
The real world is more complicated than this dis-
cussion has allowed. Them-c are mon-c thami two factor-s
of pr-oduction amid vamyimig degrees of mobility for’
these factor-s. For example, the U.S. labor- for-ce con—
taimis scientists and engirmeer’s as well as short—on-dem-
cooks. Nonetheless, the underlying analysis does sug-
gest somne generalizations. When trade occur-s, owner’s
of the resoun-ces that ar-c mor-e specialized imi the
pn-oduction ofexport goods will tend to become weal—
‘Who wins and who loses? It depends on the U.S. endowment of
capital to labor relative to other countries. If the United States has
relativelylargeramounts of capital to labor relative to othercountries,
then owners of capital would benefit, while labor would be harmed.
This result follows from the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (Stolper
and Samuelson, 1941). In the example. the United States is defined
to be capital-abundant. The example also implicitly assumes that
airplanes are produced by capital-intensive methods and automo-
biles by labor-intensive methods, Thus, the production of airplanes
requires the use of more capital relative to labor than automobiles,
Since the United States is relatively well-endowed with capital and
the production ofairplanes is capital intensive, the United States will
have a comparative advantage in the production of airplanes. With
the elimination of trade barriers, the relative price of airplanes to
automobiles will increase. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem shows
that an increase in the relative price of the capital intensive good will
increase the return to capital relative to theprices ofboth goods and
reduce the return to labor relative to the prices of both goods.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1988
thier; those who own n-esoun-ces mon-c specialized in
the production of import-competing goods will tend
to lose wealth. People also gain or- lose, howeven’,
depending on what happens to thepr-ices of the goods
they buy. Individuals who chiefly consume imported
goods will benefit, while those who pr-efer- consuming
the exported goods will lose. Thus, the net effect on
any individual depends on both the gains or losses
associated with the price changes on the goods that
he consumes and the effect of tr’ade on his wealth (or-
income I.
Increasing Unit Production Costs
A second assumption underlying the Rican’dian ex-
ample of the gains fr-ore trade is that unit production
costs ar’e constant. If unit production costs rise as
more is produced, however, the gener’al conclusions
about the gains fr-nm tr-ade remain essentially un-
changed. The major- difference is that rising unit pro-
duction costs limit the extemit to which speciahizatiomi
occurs.
Decreasing Unit Production Costs and
Imperfect Competition
On the other hand, if unit production costs de-
crease as production increases, the extent to which
actual trade patterns can be explained by comparative
advantage becomes unclear. lt also fon’ces tr-ade theory
to deal with nunmerous char-acteristics ofinternational
trade in the real wor-hd. The market structure ofindus-
tries engaged in tn’ade is fr-equently highly concen-
tnated. In other words, the individual firms in an
industry, contr’any to those in a perfectly competitive
industry, can affect the manket price oftheir good by
their productiomi and advertising decisions. In addi-
tion, trade statistics show that intra-industny trade
(i.e., the simultaneous export and import of theoutput
of the same industnz accounts for- incn-easinglv larger
shames ofwon-Id trade.
In Ihe last decade, trade theorists have developed
numnen-ous models to dealwith these facts. Anexhaus-
tive r-eview of this rapidly expanding hitenature is be-
yond the scope of this appendix; howeven, a few illus-
trative articles are discussed in order to establish
some key points. Brander (1981) and Br-ander and
Knugman (1983) developed models using ahomogene-
ous good to highlight how imperfect competition can
cause intra-industry trade and how intna-industry
tn-ade can arise in the absence of cost differences.
Assume two countries with one fir’m in each coun-
try. The firms an-c pm’oducing a homogeneous good
under identical cost situations and then-c am-cno trans-
pontation costs. Each firm openates under what is
termed a ‘‘Cournot comijectun-e,’’ meaning that each
firm assumnes its pmoduction decision ivill not affect its
rival’s pm’oduction decision. Before inter-national tnade,
each firm hasa monopoly position in its home man-ket.
Aliowing for- fr-cetrade induces each fin-rn to emiter the
othen br-ms niarket, because price exceeds mnamginal
cost in each coumitry. ‘Thus, the same good will flow to
and fr-om each country.
Kierzkowski l1987n has noted that the bulk of intn-a-
industry trade involves differentiated rather than ho-
mogeneous goods. Two approaches, Lancaster’s
(1979) chanacteristics approach and Dixit and Stighitz’s
(1977) “hove of variety” appr-oach, have pr-ovided the
foundation for- trade models involving differentiated
goods.
In the chanactenistics approach, individuals have
pn-eferences for- the characteristics of goods m-ather
than for- collections of time goods themselves, A group
of goods is defined as goods possessing the sanre
characteristics but in diffem-ent pn-oportions. Adiversity
in consumner pr-eferences causes different consumner-s
to pr-efen different products (i.e., van’ieties)ofagr-oup of
goods.
Fleipman (1981)and Lancaster’)lSSD) used the char--
actem-istics appr’oach to show how intra-industry tnade
results fn’om combining the demand for- variety with
economies of scale, The change fr-om autan-chy to free
trade enlarges the mar-ket and causes output of the
existing varieties to increase and the production of
new varieties to begin. Consumers gain from the pro-
ductiomm of more varieties and lowem pr-ices as econo-
mies of scale are realized,
The sources of gains from tr-ade are identical using
the love-of-variety and character-istics appr-oaches. In
the love-of-variety approach, which is used by Dixit
and Norman )1980r, consumers have identical tastes
and prefen’ toconsume as many types of the differenti-
ated product as possible.
The introduction of imperfect competition and de-
clining unit pm-oduction costs suggest three sources of
gain from free trade. As the market potentially served
by firms expands fi-om a national to a world market,
there will be gains due to declining unit production
costs. The second is the reduction in nmonopol~power
of firnms faced with foreign competitors. The thin-d is
the gain to consumer-s fm-onn lower prices and in-
creased product variety. Gener-ally speaking. gains
from trade result from the increase in competitive
pr-essures as the domestic econonmy becomes less
insulated from the world economy. Nonetheless, time
numerous market structur-es and firm hehavion’s pos-
sible under imperfect competition preclude a defini-







The demand curve is D,,and themarginal cost curve is
MC,,~.(The mnarginah revenue curve associated with lJ,,~
is omitted.) The monopoly pr-ice and output are P,~
and Q~
The change from autarchy to free tnade tr’ansforms
the national monopolies into a world duopoly. As-
suninng the firnis follow a Cournot str-ate~’, price
declines from P~to P,~, sales in the United States
incnease from Q,,, to Ii’,,,, and consumer’s gain an-ca P~
ES P,, or h + i. Profits ignoring fixed costs) in the
United States decline fr-om area P,,, RWM or i+j +k to
area P, SXM or j +k+ 1. The domestic firm has one-
half ofthe domestic market, so itsprofits an-c j with k +
Igoing to the foreign firm. The domestic firm’sexpon-ts
allow it to captune one-half of theforeign mar-ket. Ifthe
foreign mar-ket is identical to the domestic market, the
firm’s profits on ibr-eign sales will equal k + I. There-
fore, the net reduction in the domestic fin-rn’s profits is
— I and the overall welfare gain to the economy is
h + I.
Sometimes the benefits of expanded consumption
resulting from fl-ce trade an-c less than the costs associ-
ated with distorted pr-oduction. Venables and Smith
(1986) pn-ovide a graphical illustn-ation, duplicated in
figure 3, of the pr’eceding point using the Br-ander-
Kr-ugman duopoly model. Assume the U.S. market and
the market in the rest of the won-Id for- a specific good
are monopolies, the good is produced at a constant
marginal cost, and there are no tr-ansportation costs.
Ifthe assumption of identically sized domestic and
foreign mar-kets is dropped, then a different conclu-
sion is possible. Ifthe foreign market is smaller- than
the domestic, the profits of the domestic firm in the
foreign market will be less than k+1 .Assuming zero
exports, the domestic gains fr-nm trade are h — k, and
the domestic economy could lose from fnee trade. In
this case, consumer- gains can be mon-c than offset by
the shifting of profits fi-onm the domestic to the fbreign
economy. ‘l’his shifting reflects the contraction of an
activity that is already too little to an even smaller-level.
TI
w~x